The banking industry has been trying to get Congress to pay attention to the harmful effects of the growing regulatory burden for years.
Some may recall the Carter Golembe study, commissioned by the American Bankers Association in 1989. His report concluded: "Regulation in banking is pervasive. Internal operations, competitive practices, product offerings and relationships with customers are all subject to intervention."
Since then, banking regulation has become far more pervasive. The uninformed, who include members of Congress, will argue that if there is too much regulation, why did so many consumers lose their homes in foreclosure, and why did the industry have to be bailed out? In my opinion, the real culprit was the repeal of Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act, which prohibited banks that were members of the Federal Reserve System from affiliating with any business organization "engaged principally" in issuing, underwriting, or selling securities. Its repeal provided an incentive for banks to generate large volumes of mortgages that their affiliates could securitize and sell to investors.
Had they kept these mortgages in their portfolios they would not have followed such loose underwriting standards. These loose standards spawned The Mortgage Reform and Predatory Lending Act, enacted as Title XIV of Dodd-Frank. Not all of the rules implementing Title XIV have been finalized, but it is clear that they will add substantially to the already crushing regulatory burden, especially on community banks, which cannot afford the resources necessary to keep up with the never-ending avalanche of laws and regulations that apply to consumer transactions.
One of the problems in alerting members of Congress to the problem is that they rarely even read the full text of the bills upon which they are voting. I doubt whether Christopher Dodd and Barney Frank read the almost 1,000 pages of their bill. Who were the draftsmen of the Dodd-Frank Act and who gave them their marching orders?
One of the problems typically associated with bank legislation is that often its drafters seem to be unfamiliar with existing law, resulting in redundancies and an often confusing placement of provisions affecting a particular subject in different sections of the U.S. Code. For example, there are provisions respecting real estate appraisals in a number of different statutes. Grouping them in one place would save already over-burdened lawyers and compliance officers from having to look in a number of different directions to find all of the requirements regarding appraisals.
I attribute this shortcoming to the fact that there are few banking law generalists today. This is the result of two factors, the growth in volume and increasing complexity of bank regulation, and the need for employers, whether of banks, outside firms or the government, to quickly develop specialists in specific areas who can hit the ground running.
The question is what can we do about the excessive regulations? I believe a new approach to delivering the message is required. Instead of white papers and other written presentations, why not produce a video that members of Congress could pop into their laptops and watch on their (too) frequent trips home. It could focus on a typical banking transaction, such as a residential mortgage loan, and show the various laws, regulations, official guidance and other regulatory issuances that come into play at every stage of the process.
The video could also focus on procedures banks must put in place before the customer walks in the door, such as SAFE Act registration, adoption of policies and procedures regarding real estate lending generally, real estate appraisal and evaluation policies and procedures, establishment of a consumer compliance program and so on.

















































1) 1978 - The Marquette Decision wiped out state usury laws, allowing out of state banks a competitive advantage over local banks,
2) 1980 - Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act, which increased deposit insurance amounts from $40,000 to $100,000 and began phasing out interest rate ceilings on deposit accounts. (Funny thing is, right after that interest bearing account rates began dropping through the floor:
http://www.brimg.net/images/chart-savings-rate.jpg
So I guess raising the caps - yay for consumers - meant nothing. Now we don't bother looking what interest rate yield at all - we shop for banks with the best fee structure. Note the reversal of dynamic here. We look for the bank which takes the least from us, not the bank who has something to offer.)
3) 1982 - Garn-St. Germain which deregulates thrifts almost entirely, allowing commercial lending as well as allowing for a new type of account to compete with money market funds.
Intermission: Shortly after this began the S&L Crisis which resulted in destroying an entire government agency, the FSLIC, in 1987.
4) 1989 - Financial Institutions Reform and Recovery Act was passed to deal with this mess, which took 10 years to unwind. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board became the Office of Thrift Supervision (which itself was recently dissolved) and the responsibilities of the FSLIC (declared insolvent) were taken over by the FDIC.
5) 1994 - Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act eliminated restrictions on interstate banking.
6) 1996 - Greenspan Decides to Stop Enforcing Glass-Steagall. How he thought he had the power to decide on his own to do this is beyond me. We can blame Washington for the fact that he got away with it.
7) 1998 - Citigroup snaps up Travelers, which it later spun off again, after relieving it of it's investment bank arm, made up of Smith Barney and Shearson-Lehman. If anyone was interested, this was against the law, so in
8) 1999 - Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was passed by a clueless Congress to grease the ways for Citi to become a superbank. Lest anyone (like Brooksley Born) consider regulating the exotic credit derivatives which began trading like hotcakes,
9) 2000 - the Commodity Futures Modernization Act was rammed through a really dimwitted congress by Alan Greenspan (may he burn in hell) and Larry Summers. Lastly, the SEC proposes
10) 2004 - Consolidated Supervised Entities Program, which suggested that financial regulation become VOLUNTARY.
I'm not a banker. I'm not a financial professional. I know what credit derivatives are, how they are billed as hedging instruments (though they're really a bank's biggest profit center). One can blame Freddie and Fannie all one wants for the housing crisis, but the fact of the matter is all those mortgages were generated by banks.
I've seen two mammoth, industry-wide banking cries in my lifetime, both of which were the result of repealed regulation or a deliberate refusal to enforce.
Bankers cannot be trusted to run their banks well. We have all seen this TWICE in less than 30 years. To any banker who's angry over the regulatory burden, all I can say is, next time you are at a convention of bankers, turn to the one next to you. You've found someone to blame.
Don't worry about your regulatory burden. Worry about pitchforks.