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Principal Forgiveness: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly

Last week's announcement by the Federal Housing Finance Agency regarding its economic assessment of a proposed principal reduction program set off another round of debate over the merits of such programs. Whether a policy of forgiving principal can address problems in the housing market appears to be lost in the rhetoric from both sides of the issue. Answers to four key questions on principal reductions can clarify many misconceptions. 

The first question is: How much impact can this program have?  The latest figures from CoreLogic suggest that there are more than 11 million borrowers who are underwater on their mortgages.  Moreover, FHFA states that 4.6 million of these are Fannie Mae- or Freddie Mac-backed loans with 2.5 million of these having current loan-to-value ratios above 115%. 

Remember that the agency had specifically considered extending the Principal Reduction Alternative – a subset of the federal Home Affordable Modification Program – to loans guaranteed by Fannie and Freddie. As a best-case scenario after other program exclusions, the potential number of loans of about 500,000 would make up less than 5% of the total number of underwater mortgages in the country.  Factoring other restrictions such as the percentage of borrowers likely to participate in the program, the proportion falls to just 2% of all underwater borrowers.  These numbers suggest that the proposed HAMP PRA program is unlikely to be an effective public policy solution to the underwater mortgage problem on its own.

The second question is whether principal reductions are economically viable policy tools, and from whose perspective? 

In testimony to Congress, Laurie Goodman of Amherst Securities provided a comparison of costs associated with foreclosure versus principal reduction. In her example, taking into consideration the haircut to property value for a foreclosure and associated costs, on a current loan balance of approximately $280,000 an investor would stand to lose about $96,000 more with a foreclosure than with a principal reduction to 100% of the current property value. Fannie Mae's assessment of principal reductions found such a program to yield a positive net present value under a range of alternative scenarios.  From this perspective, principal reductions can provide a meaningful benefit over other default remedies on an individual loan basis.

One of the more debated issues surrounding principal reduction programs relates to the potential for moral hazard. The theory is that a borrower current on the mortgage may have an incentive to go delinquent in order to take advantage of a principal reduction program. Proponents of principal reduction programs tend to believe this is an immaterial issue, but some recent estimates from actual experience suggest otherwise. A recent study by Chris Mayer and others of a modification program introduced as part of a legal settlement on Countrywide Financial mortgages found that controlling for other factors, the percentage of borrowers rolling from current to 60 days delinquent rose 13% following the modification program announcement. (Full disclosure: I worked at Countrywide from 2004 to 2006.) Moreover, Goodman in her testimony acknowledges the potential for moral hazard showing that the incidence of defaults by owner-occupants eligible for HAMP was significantly higher around the announcement of the program than that of investor-occupants.

These findings suggest that strategic default is a substantial problem for modification programs in general, although the prospect for principal reduction may intensify the borrower incentive for strategic default.

Finally, if moral hazard is a real concern for principal reduction programs, are there mechanisms to mitigate this problem? Certainly it is possible to impose conditions on borrower delinquency at the time of the announcement, as Goodman and others have said. But other solutions, such as adding a shared appreciation component to the principal reduction, could mitigate some of the incentive to strategically default.  The shared appreciation concept is more than an abstract idea.  Servicers such as Ocwen have used such structures as part of their principal reduction efforts with apparent success. Some form of shared appreciation mortgage should be featured in principal reduction programs to limit moral hazard. Requiring these borrowers to sacrifice some portion of future gains would also be fairer to homeowners who continued to make payments even though they were upside-down on their mortgages.

The FHFA's conclusion regarding principal reduction modifications was based in part on the cost that would be borne by taxpayers, including the Treasury subsidy for the program and the potential for moral hazard.  Putting those issues aside, the HAMP principal forgiveness program, if implemented, would not appreciably help improve the housing market (The Bad). Principal reductions generally could be more useful if applied across the full spectrum of underwater borrowers with some form of shared appreciation (The Good) in order to reduce the potential for moral hazard (The Ugly).

 Clifford Rossi is an executive-in-residence and Tyser Teaching Fellow at the University of Maryland's Robert H. Smith School of Business. He has held senior risk management and credit positions at Citigroup, Washington Mutual, Countrywide, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae.


(7) Comments



Comments (7)
Sorry but you missed the boat. What you perceive as a link between loan modification program rollouts and loan delinquencies is not related to strategic default by the borrower.

The relationship between loan modification rollouts and loan delinquencies is directly related to Mortgage Servicers telling homeowners that they would only be eligible for the loan modifications if they were delinquent.... by 90 days was best.

The only moral hazards are the Mortgage Servicers who decieve the homeowners with bad information for self-enrichment.
Posted by sjnewport | Monday, August 20 2012 at 2:25PM ET

On Monday, Lawsky had reproduced what he said were quotes from an unidentified Standard Chartered executive director in a conversation in 2006 that demonstrated the bank's "obvious contempt" for U.S. banking regulations.

"You f---ing Americans. Who are you to tell us, the rest of the world, that we're not going to deal with Iranians?" the quote was rendered in documents released by the regulators.

People familiar with the situation said the bank's group finance director, Richard Meddings, one of five executive directors at the time, was the unnamed man."
Posted by OLDER&WISER | Thursday, August 09 2012 at 2:00AM ET
There is no doubt that principal reduction results in higher investor NPV than a loss of security to predatory servier fees. In 35 years of litigation management--I have never seen the disregard for cost benefit legal analyses which characterizes foreclosure litigation. Attorneys manage themselves, deliberately drag out and compel homeowners to file defensive litigation. The bank trustees have lost control over the private lable collectors.
Posted by OLDER&WISER | Thursday, August 09 2012 at 12:46AM ET
@LRyanM: I've added a link to the Mayer study. Regards -- Ed.
Posted by Marc Hochstein, Editor in Chief, American Banker | Wednesday, August 08 2012 at 4:44PM ET
Regarding Chris Mayer study that was cited, but not linked to, when and over what period of time did the 13% increase occur and how does that stack up with the rest of the market? Default rates around the time of the Countrywide settlement were skyrocketing, how does he assign causality here? Also, as former employee, you are surely aware of the standard practice of loss mit employees telling people seeking help 'call me back when you're 3 months behind'
Posted by LRyanM | Wednesday, August 08 2012 at 4:30PM ET
Editor's Note: The text has been corrected, per the author's comment above, and a link has been added to Laurie Goodman's testimony.
Posted by Marc Hochstein, Editor in Chief, American Banker | Wednesday, August 08 2012 at 3:16PM ET
Author's correction: To be clear I should have stated that a 100% reduction in current market value not current loan amount was the basis for the principal reduction/foreclosure comparison in Goodman's testimony.
Posted by | Wednesday, August 08 2012 at 3:00PM ET
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