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Fannie Mae Defender Misses the Mark

DEC 20, 2011 3:43pm ET
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Like so many “experts” critiquing the role of the GSEs in the lingering financial crisis, New York Times columnist Joe Nocera appears to suffer from selective amnesia.  

In his column today, Nocera attempts to dispel the notion that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac ‘caused’ the mortgage crisis by introducing a theory that the GSEs "got into subprime mortgages, with great trepidation … in 2005 and 2006 … only because they were losing so much market share to Wall Street." 

Take a trip down to the morgue, Joe.

In September 1999, the paper for which Nocera now writes reported that Fannie Mae was bowing to pressure from the Clinton administration and the banking industry to ease the credit requirements on loans it would purchase as part of a new national effort to expand homeownership amongst low- and moderate-income people.  

In an incredible display of poor judgment, the new national policy was to have Fannie act as repository of increased lending to so-called subprime borrowers whose incomes, credit ratings and savings were not good enough to qualify for conventional mortgage loans.  

In other words, it was now OK for banks, thrifts and mortgage companies to make long-term mortgage loans to people who could not afford them under credit guidelines that had proven themselves reliable over generations, because the loans could be off-loaded to a government-backed corporation.

The 1999 article observed that, “In moving, even tentatively, into this new area of lending, Fannie Mae is taking on significantly more risk, which may not pose any difficulties during flush economic times.  But, the government-subsidized corporation may run into trouble in an economic downturn, prompting a government rescue similar to that of the savings and loan industry in the 1980’s.”

Later in the article, Peter Wallison, then a resident fellow at the American Enterprise, made this prophetic observation: “If they fail, the government will have to step up and bail them out the way it stepped up and bailed out the thrift industry.”  

So the future of institutionalized, imprudent mortgage lending to people who could not otherwise afford the loans was foretold in 1999. The inevitable collapse materialized in 2007 when borrowers could no longer make the payments. Regulators woke up to the problem in 2008. And, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 did virtually nothing to change the system.     

In the final irony, the legislation designed to correct the excesses that caused the financial crisis bears the names of two of President Clinton’s Congressional minions who helped to push Fannie Mae into the imprudent lending scheme that precipitated the financial crisis in the first place.  

Jim Wells is the president of Wellspring Consulting International Inc. in Fort Lauderdale.

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Industry 'Eating Its Young,' Scapegoating Consultants, Foreclosure Deal Debacle: Quotes of the Week
The most notable quotes from American Banker stories of the previous week. Readers are encouraged to add their own observations in the Comments fields at the bottom of each slide.

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Comments (17)
Marc Hochstein, Executive Editor, American Banker: I respectfully disagree with Jim Wells. The HUD housing goals aside, the GSEs initially resisted the market trends and practices that fueled the subprime bubble of the mid-aughts. Freddie was very wary of stated-income loans when those started to creep up on the market. (See here: http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/169_76/-220176-1.html.) When Freddie later embraced adjustable-rate and other riskier loans, Fannie made an effort to stay disciplined for a time (see here: http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/170_93/-249010-1.html and here: http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/170_108/-251557-1.html) But in the end both GSEs succumbed. Nocera is right; Fannie and Freddie couldn't stand to lose market share to the private-label mortgage securitizations (i.e. Wall Street).
Yes, giving in to this competitive pressure cost the GSEs' preferred and common shareholders, and the U.S. taxpayer, dearly. Should market share and short-term profits and bonuses be the primary consideration for any business, let alone one that has the backing of the U.S Treasury? Probably not. But the fact remains: Fan and Fred were late to the subprime party, which was already getting rowdy when they finally showed up, against their own better judgment, with a fresh case of Four Loko.
Posted by Marc Hochstein, Executive Editor, American Banker | Tuesday, December 20 2011 at 4:33PM ET
Numerous studies have shown that it was primarily the non-agency loans that were the problem. No doc, 125% LTV, pick a payment were not GSE inventions. The GSEs came crashing down AS DID THE REST OF THE HOUSING MARKET AS VALUES DECREASED 20-40%
Posted by andkel | Tuesday, December 20 2011 at 5:03PM ET
Not surprising that a corrupted structure would eventually lead to a bad end. Does anyone think that a Freddie as originally cooperatively organized would have come to this bad end? For many years, when all of Freddie's stock was owned by the thrifts who sold mortgages to the GSE, there was a tremendous amount of peer pressure not to dump bad mortgages into Freddie as doing so would have diminished the investment value of the other thrift owners. Perhaps a similar cooperative model is worth re-examination.
Posted by ricpfi | Tuesday, December 20 2011 at 5:06PM ET
The central premise that Fannie and Freddie got into sub-prime to defend market share against private label competiton is at best only half right. First, they also cooperated with Fannie and Freddie, who bought most of the private label securities to meet F&F housing goals. Second, so-called private label securitizers were no more private than were Fannie and Freddie: TBTF banks use the same regulatory arbitrage to achieve similar leverage and funding costs. The bottom line is we need banks (but not TBTF), we don't need Fannie and Freddie and never did.
Posted by kvillani | Tuesday, December 20 2011 at 5:19PM ET
The problem was primarily created by the 6 largest banks that developed the sub-prime products and through FM watch wanted ti dininish Fannie and Freddie as competitors. Now they the 6 largest banks have 72% of the servicing market and they have found out their model doesn't work for serviding as well. If privitizing the secondary market means turing the market completely over to the 6 largest banks after they created mess, good luck.
Posted by wdbrennan | Tuesday, December 20 2011 at 5:20PM ET
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