Law and regulation

A big trading loss at Chase has some community bank CEOs discussing a second tier of regulation for small banks. Other CEOs believe the snafu is yet another black eye for the banking industry. And some point out that the loss is fairly insignificant to the New York company.

The Massachusetts Democrat argued following the $2 billion loss at JPMorgan Chase that it's time to bring back the division between commercial banking and investment banking.

Both sides of a bank deal need to meet with their regulators well ahead of announcing it in today's complicated world.

The presumptive Republican nominee has given almost no details about his plan to replace the Dodd-Frank Act.

White House Press Secretary Jay Carney told reporters Monday that the $2 billion loss "reinforces" the need for the 2010 reform law.

ORLANDO–If the annual Card Forum and Expo staged here last week were a car on a family trip, attendees played the roles of restless kids in the backseat asking, “Are we there yet?”

That $2 billion trading loss is just last week's headline. Is Chase so big and complicated that no CEO could apply, teach and enforce decency and the smell test?

Shareholders, creditors, counterparties and regulators deserve to know more about the causes of that $2 billion trading loss.

Government deference to big banks is a source of disgust and outrage that could ultimately lead to real reform and help all banks, says the former Tarp special inspector general.

Congress, unlike the Treasury, was one Washington institution that took a serious interest in preventing taxpayers from getting defrauded, says the former Tarp special inspector general.

The "vice-like grip" giant banks have on both parties makes their forced breakup unlikely. But momentum is rising for a move toward Glass-Steagall, says the former Tarp special inspector general.

The size of the biggest banks has made them a greater systemic risk than ever that's been compounded by the "fantasy" that living wills provide safety, says the former Tarp special inspector general.

When pressed on the AIG bailouts, the administration when on the attack and tried to trivialize a serious area of public concern, says the former Tarp special inspector general.

The Home Affordable Modification Program was so poorly implemented that it accomplished on a fraction of its stated intent, says the former Tarp special inspector general.

Tim Geithner's Treasury Department half-truths, exaggeration and intentional deceptions misled the public about Tarp and the AIG bailout, says the program's former Special Inspector General.

Giant banks pose such a threat to the economy that lawmakers have gone to extreme-and futile-lengths to protect against their failures, says the former Trap Special Inspector General.

Dodd-Frank was tailored to tame giant banks and has left smaller institutions suffering much of the collateral damage, says the former Trap Special Inspector General.

The Justice Department's fear of losing cases and lack of sophistication likely enabled many Tarp fraudsters to get off scott free, says the former Tarp Special Inspector General.

The Fed and Treasury fought fiercely to prevent Americans from learning that the Troubled Asset Relief Program was a giant bailout for banks-not homeowners-says the former Special Inspector General.

The Washington-Wall Street revolving door blinded policymakers to outside concerns and doomed the Troubled Asset Relief Program, says its former Special Inspector General.