One big say-on-pay rejection at Citigroup and one small one at FirstMerit do not make a trend.
The Dodd-Frank Act, passed in 2010, requires a shareholder advisory vote on compensation packages for public company senior officers. But only 45 companies – less than 2% of the total –received negative votes on those pay packages from a majority of their investors in 2011, according to proxy adviser Institutional Shareholder Services.
The recent majority shareholder rejection of pay packages for CEO Vikram Pandit and senior officers at Citi is an anomaly, in my opinion. There is no uprising.
Most shareholders are not activists. Relatively few voice displeasure over executive pay, or any other banking industry issues such as foreclosures or the reappointment of ineffective audit firms. About the only thing they do wake up for is to complain about poor dividends. Even activist investor Bill Ackman of Pershing Square reportedly voted yes to the Citigroup package.
Citigroup's share price is about 10% lower now than at this time last year. For short-term investors, that performance is not unexpected in this economic environment. But for long-term investors like CalPERS, which voted "no" on the say on pay proposal, and proxy advisors like ISS and Glass Lewis, which recommended a "no" vote, it is Pandit’s overall record that matters most. Citigroup’s share price today is almost 90% lower than it was when Pandit took over as CEO in 2006.
So why, under those less-than-stellar metrics, did the board try to restore CEO Pandit's pay from $1 for 2009 and 2010 to peer group levels? After all, Citigroup, more than any big bank, had the longest road back from near-failure, majority government ownership, and continued net losses after the 2008 crisis. Citigroup's most recent quarterly results were mixed. Income and revenue declined 2% from last year and the Treasury rejected the bank's request to return capital to shareholders. There are miles to go before Pandit can claim victory.
Based on the number of actual votes cast versus shares outstanding, the rejection is not as stinging as it may first appear. Only 33% of total shares outstanding actually voted on the pay packages. That's because only 75% if Citigroup's outstanding shares showed up to be counted and a whopping 21% of those ballots were broker non-votes. (A say on pay advisory vote, required at least every three years under Dodd-Frank, is a non-routine proxy matter, according to New York Stock Exchange rules and, as such, brokers can not vote proxies on behalf of shareholders that do not return them.)
The say on pay vote at Bank of New York Mellon, cited by an American Banker story as a "rupture" because only 58% of shareholders that voted approved the proposal, is also not as wrenching as it appears. At Bank of New York, 87% of the outstanding shareholders showed up and broker non-votes were only 8% of those. So the votes in favor of the pay strategy still equal 53% of those who showed up. At Citigroup that percentage was only 35%.
A lawsuit was filed within days, before the bank even filed the 8-K documenting the vote. But prevailing in a shareholder suit like this one is tough. The plaintiffs will have to prove that a lawsuit is their only recourse. Unless they can prove that the Citigroup compensation committee, for example, lacks independence, their chances of succeeding are slim. And there's no law or listing standard that requires the outside compensation consultants to be independent.
























































Thus while the theorum the author espouses is accurate over time for for all industries other than the financial industry----that is a huge exception. Those public interest investor representatives are facing rebellion by their own beneficiaries -----the banks are just now realizing that they are facing the uncomfortable reality that their shareholders are also the counterparties to the transactions. it is inherntly internally conflicting for a trutee institution with supposed fiduciary responsibiities to also look for profits by screwing the same investors that own the stock---those counterparty-shareholders pension funds--insurers are not looking too kindly on the institutions' leadership that is costing them their jobs in columbus ohio etc. how often do you have companies that are owned by public employees also being sued by those pension funds for fraud? The problem is having the traders under the same roof as large cap financial institutions--and untill they break up the CEOs should suffer--as should their staffs. Last but not least --it takes no genius to borrow billions at 0% and lend it at 5--8% --and still have a tough time.
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Use of the term "trust" on the same page with a supposed fiduciary disclaimer like this is an oxymoron--what sort of pay package should Ohio Teachers vote for BNY execs?
Contact: Mr. Felix Burke
EMAIL: felixburke@live.co.uk
TEL: +44-8442448277