The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board defines an "audit failure" as a case where the auditor does not fulfill its fundamental responsibility – to obtain reasonable assurance about whether financial statements are free of material misstatement.
In its most recent report on KPMG, issued last month, the PCAOB inspection team found twelve deficiencies that were serious enough to be considered audit failures. That's out of 52 audits KPMG conducted in 2010, the same percentage of deficiencies, 23%, as in 2009. The names of the companies whose audits were faulty are not named, per the Sarbanes-Oxley statute. KPMG audits Citigroup and Wells Fargo, as well as several other large banks such as Deutsche Bank, HSBC, Trustmark and PacWest.
The PCAOB does not choose the audits it reviews at random but based on risk. In the report card issued last year for KPMG, seven of the twelve audit failures in 2009 audits described deficiencies in the valuation and disclosure of hard-to-value financial instruments, such as collateralized mortgage obligations and other mortgage-backed securities. Deficient testing of fair value measurements, especially when third-party pricing services are used, is a source of several audit failures again this year.
In one case, KPMG auditors failed to identify or test controls over the use of prices received from an external pricing service for securities in an "available for sale" portfolio. At that same bank, KPMG failed to test assumptions used by its client to determine whether certain AFS securities with an unrealized loss position for more than twelve months were "other-than-temporarily impaired" and should be written down. KPMG is in good company allowing such shenanigans. When PricewaterhouseCoopers client JPMorgan Chase needed to mitigate the losses on the "London whale" trades, the bank sold securities from an AFS portfolio with "unrealized" gains. (AFS securities are recorded on the the balance sheet at fair value. However, unrealized holding gains and losses on AFS securities are not included in net income, as trading income or losses would be. Instead, they are reported in the statement of comprehensive income as other comprehensive income.)
In this year's inspection report, however, the focus was on the risk that KPMG auditors weren't sufficiently scrutinizing loan loss reserves and repurchase reserves or pushing back on executives using them to manage earnings. I've been saying for a long time that auditors are not forcing full disclosure of banks' potential losses and repurchase demands, as well as the related legal contingencies. Inspectors found loan loss reserves at one bank that were seven times more than a previous period with nothing but management's word to back them up. At another bank, loans had been reclassified to fool the models that calculate reserves. Inspectors cited more than one case where banks booked unallocated reserves with little or no explanation demanded by auditors.
I've written about KPMG client Citigroup's use of loan loss reserves as a "cookie jar" to manipulate earnings each quarter. Although Citigroup claims it uses complex models to estimate additions to and releases from loan loss reserves, in reality all loan loss reserves are held in an unallocated top-level account and are available for losses in any category, anywhere across the globe. It's a number that can be manipulated to plug a hole in earnings in any period.
One KPMG banking client cited in the report saw an increase in 2010 of demands from, and disputes with, buyers of mortgages it originated during the last five years. (This scenario is playing out all over the banking industry.) The PCAOB gave KPMG credit for identifying an understatement in the mortgage-repurchase reserve at year-end. KPMG also notably documented an internal control deficiency for inadequate processes for analyzing and reserving for mortgage repurchases and a lack of related controls. The bank's primary regulator and a loan purchaser had already identified weaknesses in the bank's loan origination and appraisal processes.


















































The Statement of Comprehensive Income adjusts an entity's net income for items that "by-pass" the income statements, such as net unrealized holding gains/losses related to available-for-sale securities.
From the JPM 1! 10Q
"Since March 31, 2012, CIO has had significant mark-to-market losses in its synthetic credit portfolio, and this portfolio has proven to be riskier, more volatile and less effective as an economic hedge than the Firm previously believed. The losses in CIO's synthetic credit portfolio have been partially offset by realized gains from sales, predominantly of credit-related positions, in CIO's AFS securities portfolio. As of March 31, 2012, the value of CIO's total AFS securities portfolio exceeded its cost by approximately $8 billion. Since then, this portfolio (inclusive of the realized gains in the second quarter to date) has appreciated in value."
I was imprecise. I will look at how to clarify.
Thanks for bringing that to my attention. Addressed.
I'm really amused by her inference that Chase somehow "fudged" actual realized gains on sales of securities.
"In one case, KPMG auditors failed to identify or test controls over the use of prices received from an external pricing service for securities in an "available for sale" portfolio. At that same bank, KPMG failed to test assumptions used by its client to determine whether certain AFS securities with an unrealized loss position for more than twelve months were "other-than-temporarily impaired" and should be written down. KPMG is in good company allowing such shenanigans. When PricewaterhouseCoopers client JPMorgan Chase needed to mitigate the losses on the "London whale" trades, the bank sold securities from an AFS portfolio with "unrealized" gains."
So what exactly are you accusing PwC of doing in this paragraph? You imply that PwC did something wrong because JP Morgan sold some securities in an unrealized gain position. Please explain to us exactly what PwC did wrong here? Are you saying JP Morgan committed a fraud by selling some securities to make up for a loss on other securities and PwC failed to report it? Are you saying PwC should have told JPMorgan that they could not sell those securities to make up for the losses? Are you saying that PwC should have made them leave the unrealized gain in OCI instead of taking it to the P&L even though the gain had been recognized? Are you implying that PwC didn't test the sale and the gain recorded was actually a loss? If so, what evidence do you have of that? How does KPMG failing to test values for available for sale securities have anything at all to do with the situation at JPMorgan? Please elaborate on what exactly PwC allowed that they shouldn't have allowed.