Ask any prudential regulator if it is too soon for banks to be releasing loan-loss reserves, and the answer would be "Yes."
Make that, "Hell, yes."
And yet in the second quarter, the biggest banks beefed up earnings by draining reserves. Yes, credit quality did improve, so executives claimed they had no option but to shrink reserves. As is often the case, Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan Chase & Co. was the CEO who put the finest point on it.
"You should assume we don't like to release loan-loss reserves," Dimon told analysts and reporters on the company's second-quarter call last month. "Put it this way: We will take them down only if we have to."
In other words, blame the accountants.
But when policymakers the world over are fretting over bank capital levels, why are federal regulators standing by and letting banks take down reserves before it is clear that credit quality has turned the corner?
"If you believe capital is too low, then this is sort of ridiculous," said Bob Eisenbeis, a former Atlanta Fed official who is now the chief monetary economist at Cumberland Advisors.
Interestingly, Tim Long, the chief national bank examiner at the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, used the same word during an interview on the topic.
"For accountants to go in and say, 'Well the recession is over, and now we want you to start making negative provisions,' I think that is just absolutely ridiculous," Long said.
So it's not just bank executives blaming the accountants.
But how is it that bank regulators and bank executives have so little sway over the accountants? Why is the Securities and Exchange Commission's stick bigger than the bank regulators'?
The examiner vs. accountant debate has a long and messy history. Back in the mid-1990s, the SEC went after SunTrust Banks Inc., accusing it of hoarding reserves in flush quarters so it could smooth out earnings by draining them in bad ones. Bank regulators were outraged, claiming the SEC had wandered into safety and soundness territory and should leave such decisions to examiners.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 tried to arrange a truce through the Roukema amendment, which required the SEC to "consult and coordinate comments with the appropriate federal banking agency before taking any action or rendering any opinion regarding the manner in which an insured depository institution or depository institution holding company reports loan-loss reserves in its financial statement, including the amount of such reserves."
All the agencies issued policy statements pledging to play nice. Years of record bank profits followed, and the feud went dormant. Until now.
"I don't want them releasing reserves too soon," Long said of the banks he supervises. "We have warned our banks about that. We have told them to be careful."
He added: "I think the bank regulators need to be more assertive in the way that we take ownership of the loan-loss reserve."
And yet it keeps happening. On Aug. 9 CVB Financial Corp. in Ontario, Calif., said that it had received a subpoena from the SEC's Los Angeles office seeking information about how it calculates its loan-loss reserves.
The company's main banking unit, the $6.8 billion-asset Citizens Business Bank, had just been examined by its primary federal regulator, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., and reported its second-quarter results, so investors were rattled to discover that the SEC's perspective might differ from the FDIC's. CVB's stock dropped 22% when the subpoena was disclosed and has not fully recovered.