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Model-Driven Regulation Fueled Bubble, Hobbles Recovery

Five years since the beginning of what some label the "Great Recession," economic growth in the U.S. and Europe remains tepid to non-existent.  Central banks maintain close to 0% interest rates and pump trillions of dollars into the banking system with little or no positive effect on economic growth and job creation.

We search for the causes of our economic malaise in all the wrong places.  Government leaders would do well to look in the mirror.

We will not have solid and sustainable economic recovery unless it is led by the financial sector.  The financial sector will not be able to lead the recovery unless we implement sensible, effective, and efficient regulatory policies.  The confusion sowed by up to 20,000 pages of regulations mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act is precisely what we don't need.

The litany of problems in financial regulation is too long for this article.  So we will focus on just one – the risk-based capital models imposed under the Basel international accords.

The Federal Reserve was enamored with risk-based capital models since at least the 1960s.  It sounds good in theory – riskier categories of assets would have more capital allocated to them than less-risky categories.

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. refused to go down this path for several reasons.  Models are necessarily backward looking, not reliable predictors of future events, and introduce pro-cyclicality to bank regulation that results in more pronounced booms and busts. 

Regulators are not particularly qualified to assign risk weightings to various categories of assets.  Moreover, there is pressure for regulators to assign lower risk weightings to certain types of "socially desirable" lending.  Finally, bankers will often find ways to "game" the models.

The FDIC preferred to set a minimum capital level (in the 1980s it was 5% tangible equity to assets).  The examination process was used to require capital above the minimum through on-site evaluation of a bank's assets, liquidity, off-balance sheet exposures, interest rate and other operating risks, earnings, and management.

Two events conspired to change this system during the 1990s.  First, blame for the $150 billion cost to taxpayers of cleaning up the S&L mess was inappropriately placed solely on financial regulators and led to a more "rules based" approach toward bank regulation. 

Second, large banks were competing more globally for business and foreign banks were invading the U.S. market.  Large U.S. banks generally had higher capital requirements than their foreign counterparts and lobbied for a system to put large domestic and foreign banks on the same footing.

Conditions were right for the Basel I and then Basel II international capital accords (Basel II was a disaster so now we are on Basel III).  Basel brought international banks closer together on capital requirements, largely by bringing the top banks down rather than bringing the bottom banks up. 

As feared, governments used the models to steer credit to their favorite sectors.  A loan to Apple, Microsoft or a family drug store would carry a 100% risk weighting.   Sovereign debt – i.e., loans made to the governments writing the rules – was given a zero risk weighting.  Housing loans – another favorite of politicians – were given a 50% risk weight (25% if you securitized the loans and bought back the securities).  Not surprisingly, excessive real estate and sovereign lending followed.

Today the backward looking models are demanding substantially higher capital, encouraging banks to shrink their balance sheets and curtail lending.  Moreover, because the Basel models are applicable throughout the world, nearly every major country is simultaneously mired in same economic quicksand, and none can lead the way out.

Regulation of banks should always be counter-cyclical.  In good times, regulators should pressure banks to slow their growth, tighten their lending standards, and increase their capital and loss reserves.  In times of trouble, regulators should urge banks to continue lending to worthy customers even if capital and reserve ratios decline to some extent. 

The Basel capital accords are a serious policy mistake.  It's time to return to financial supervision that relies on good judgment and on-site examinations.  Models should be no more than a tool to assist management and regulators in the exercise of good judgment.  The current system of model-driven supervision helped create a huge worldwide bubble and is now seriously impeding economic recovery.

Richard M. Kovacevich is the retired chairman and CEO of Wells Fargo & Company. William M. Isaac, former chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, is senior managing director and global head of financial institutions at FTI Consulting, chairman of Fifth Third Bancorporation, and author of Senseless Panic: How Washington Failed America. The views expressed are their own.


(8) Comments



Comments (8)
We need to all agree that the 2008 Financial Crisis was caused by hyper annual growth of aggregate real estate secured debt both for single family homes and commercial real estate. If we all agree to this observation and realize that regulation modifications should be only focused on managing the growth of aggregate real estate secured debt each year, we can eliminate all the nonesense of Dodd-Frank regulations and hyper regulation of the banks clogging up real estate loan production processes and investor demand for real estate mortgage backed securities. I contend that if aggregate real estate debt growth rates were in line with the average US economic GDP and CPI rates from 2000 through 2007, the mortgage backed securities based on them would have not collapsed. It appears the country is mired into the contention of implementing unproven highly complex regulatory resolutions when a simple solution of regulating aggregate real estate growth within the financial system can be regulated. It can be regulated increasing interest rates on real estate secured loans to a level that would decrease speculation risk in property prices and keep the US financial system safe by growing aggregate real estate growth to US economic growth and inflation rates. Today, we do not need to assign a higher risk on making new loans when most of the risk of real estate secured loans are in legacy portfolios in Banks and GSE's originated from 2003 through 2007. The risk of originating real estate loans today is due to the uncertainty we are all creating implementing regulations that are not necessary. We are slowly killing our real estate capital markets by not understanding why the 2008 Financial Crisis occured and how to prevent it from occuring again. Marc Thompson CRE
Posted by thompsoncre | Monday, July 30 2012 at 1:27PM ET
If all our current banking leaders were as fundamentally sound as these two we would have an industry positioned too take on the the non bank competitors and restore the trust and confidence the industry needs. Bankers are like baseball hitters and they all need too be in the batting cage daily learning the strike zone for risk management and understand the difference between debt.and capital needs of their borrowers given all situations. Modeling is great yet fundamental balls and strikes have not changed for decades. Let's return too the basics...
Posted by Rdo | Monday, July 23 2012 at 10:55PM ET
All points are valid and on point from two of our industry leaders that are fundamentally sound in their banking practices. Yet, my view is that financial service leaders of the past 10 years were influenced by a politically driven fed that made many errors in its forecasts while the banking segment relaxed it's discipline underwrite and manage risk
Posted by Rdo | Monday, July 23 2012 at 10:31PM ET
If all banks were run the way Mr. Kovacevich ran his bank then I'd agree 100% But, sadly that is not the case. I've actually spent time reading what various regulatory agencies have said about Basel III. The only community banks that will be at risk from Basil III are very thinly capitalized banks that are doing highly risky lending. I've yet to see any study that actually shows how this will end community banking.

Also, remember that the regulators tried to do something about the growth in commercial real estate (especially development loans) a few year ago and the industry screamed like a stuck hog.

Regulation, or a lack of regulation, did not cause the problems in the banking sector. The problems were caused by poor decisions by management and boards of banks. Had the root cause of the problems been the government then far, far more banks would have failed. Banks fail for the same reason most other businesses fail: poor management and not enough capital to weather the storm.
Posted by Bob_Viering | Monday, July 23 2012 at 3:56PM ET
I have a lot of respect for the insights of both of these gentlemen, but that horse has already left the barn.
Posted by kappa1973 | Monday, July 23 2012 at 3:20PM ET
Kovacevich and Isaac nail it. Basel III will eventually destroy the community banking industry. Basel III is a far greater threat to community banks than Dodd/Frank regulations. Basel III in combination with several of the Dodd/Frank regulations are a deadly regulatory Molotov cocktail that will blow up community banks.
Posted by commobanker | Monday, July 23 2012 at 12:30PM ET
hterris1 -- You miss the middle ground we seek. We need a strong, slightly boring, banking system to make sound loans to individuals and smaller businesses and lead the nation into economic recovery. That cannot happen unless we implement far more effective, hands-on regulation that is counter-cylical, not pro-cyclical. The rules-based, model-driven system led us into the abyss and we can't find our way out.

Bill Isaac
Posted by isaac1 | Monday, July 23 2012 at 9:51AM ET
The question of the wisdom of risk-based capital requirements aside, many bankers and many reformers seem to be speaking different languages. The latter seek a restoration of "boring" banking that was subordinate to nonfinancial business during decades of relative financial stability after the World War II, and doubt that an economy centered on a giant financial sector can generate durable prosperity. The former argue, "We will not have solid and sustainable economic recovery unless it is led by the financial sector." - Harry Terris, data editor, American Banker
Posted by hterris1 | Monday, July 23 2012 at 9:09AM ET
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